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Abstract 
We examine the effects of the three-point rule in individual 
sports. We consider chess in which most tournaments use the 
standard rule while some tournaments use the Bilbao rule, 
which is identical to the three-point rule in soccer: We 
observe the same pairs of chess players playing under both 
rules, a research design that fits fixed-effect models. We find 
the Bilbao rule makes games 33 percent more decisive, 
mostly to white players’ advantage who win 50 percent more 
games. We identify two mechanisms why the Bilbao rule 
works: It encourages players to play longer and discourages 
them from using drawish openings. These results suggest 
incentive schemes like the three-point rule work in individual 
sports in which efforts and financial rewards are directly 
linked and game dynamics and strategic interactions among 
teammates and with opponents are less complex.  
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Introduction 
Sports use particular scoring systems to, among others, induce players to 
compete harder and make the games more exciting, but are they optimally 
designed incentive schemes? Draws, often without a single goal, were 
common in soccer so that the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) replaced the two-point rule with the three-point rule, 
which increases the rewards for a win from two to three points. Most chess 
games among elite players are draws, some are short draws, which disappoint 
fans and tournament organizers. In basketball and American football, 
however, ties are rare because of the sports’ high-scoring nature and the 
variety of ways players can score different points. 
 Intuitively, awarding more points for a win encourages aggressive 
plays and makes games more decisive but empirical evidence on the effects of 
the three-point rule in soccer is mixed, which raises the question of whether 
one extra point for a win is powerful enough an incentive to change players’ 
behavior.
1
 Moschini (2010), Aylott and Aylott (2007), and Dilger and Geyer 
(2009), for example, find the three-point rule increases the number of goals 
and decreases the proportion of drawn games; Guedes and Machado (2002), 
however, find the rule works for only underdog teams; Palacious-Huerta 
(2004) show that it does not seem to affect the average number of goals. Lee 
                                                          
1
 This line of literature relates to that on the use of tournaments and piece-rate 
incentive contracts in organizations to elicit greater employee efforts (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 2000; Shearer, 2004). 
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and Parinduri (2015), using regression discontinuity design that resembles 
randomized experiments, find the effects of the three-point rule are subtle: It 
does not make games more decisive or increase the number of goals but it 
increases the second-half goals of losing first-half teams. 
Perhaps the three-point rule matters more, provides stronger incentives, 
in individual games like chess in which players’ efforts are easily observed 
and directly linked to financial rewards.
2
 In team sports, game dynamics and 
strategic interactions among teammates and with opponent players are more 
complex. Some soccer players in a team, for example, may not respond to the 
three-point rule as strongly as their coaches want them to (which makes the 
rule less effective) or they may free ride on the efforts of their teammates—
problems that do not exist in chess.
3
 A leading soccer team may turn defensive 
to maintain the lead and still win; a chess player whose position is better 
cannot just maintain the lead—if she wants to win the game, she has to keep 
fighting until her opponent resigns.
4
 Soccer players’ salaries do not 
exclusively depend on whether their team wins a game or becomes the 
champion; financial rewards are not equally distributed among players either 
                                                          
2
 As far as we know, no theoretical papers analyzes whether the three-point rule 
matters in individual games like chess, but theoretical papers on soccer show its 
effects are also subtle (see, for example, Guedes and Machado (2002), Brocas and 
Carrillo (2004), Moschini (2010), and Haugen (2008)).  
3
 Alchain and Demstez (1972), for example, show that workers have incentive to 
shirk in team production if the marginal products of the workers are inseparable. 
4
 Chan, Courty, and Lee (2009) show, in team sports, once a team enjoys a 
comfortable margin of victory, the team’s efforts may drop. 
4 
 
(players’ contracts may differ from one another). A chess player gets the entire 
prize money for herself if she wins a tournament.   
In this paper, using fixed-effect models, we examine the effects of the 
three-point rule in chess by exploiting variations in rules used by tournament 
organizers. Most organizers have always used the standard rule, which 
rewards one point for a win, 0.5 for a draw, and zero for a loss; but recently 
several organizers have used a new rule called the Bilbao rule, which rewards 
three points for a win, one for a draw, and zero for a loss. (The Bilbao rule 
therefore resembles the three-point rule in soccer: It increases the value of a 
win from the value of one draw to that of three draws.) We control for factors 
that may affect players’ behavior and their participation in tournaments that 
use the Bilbao rule, which include player-, round-, and year fixed effects. 
Hence, we compare similar games (i.e., games played by the same pairs of 
players, in the same rounds relative to the last round, whose ratings and 
numbers of wins (at the start of the round) were similar, and so on) that differ 
only in one respect: Some games are played under the standard rule while 
others the Bilbao rule. If we see the outcomes of games under the Bilbao rule 
differ from those under the standard rule, we can attribute the difference to the 
Bilbao rule’s extra point for a win. 
We find the Bilbao rule induces players to fight harder: It makes games 
33 percent more decisive, mostly to white players’ advantage who win 50 
percent more games. We do not find evidence that the Bilbao rule increases 
black players’ likelihood of winning or losing games, probably because, in 
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games played by top grandmasters, black players initially try to neutralize 
white players’ first mover advantage and only fight to win when white players 
make inaccurate moves. However, as white players play more aggressively, 
the Bilbao rule is likely to press black players to work harder to secure a draw. 
Overall, therefore, the Bilbao rule induces players to play fighting chess and 
makes games more decisive.   
We identify two mechanisms why the Bilbao rule works. It makes 
players play longer (by four to five moves, about 10 percent longer): Players 
work harder, take more risks of making errors, and, when opportunities arise, 
try to squeeze a win. The rule also discourages players from using drawish 
openings (by about 23 percent if we define drawish openings as ones with 40 
percent draws in past games), which makes games more likely to be 
imbalanced and double-edged. 
We contribute to the literature by examining the effects of the three-
point rule in individual sports using chess data, which allows us to control for 
many factors that may confound identification.
5
 We show the three-point rule 
induces chess players to fight harder and makes chess games more likely to be 
decisive. Therefore, modifying scoring systems of sports, if it adds sufficiently 
strong incentives, may change players’ behaviour—results that give hopes to 
league officials who want to make their leagues more competitive. 
                                                          
5
 So far, the discussions of the effect of the Bilbao rule have been confined to only 
blogs and newspaper articles (see, for example, Fernȃndez (2007) and McClain 
(2010)). 
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We proceed as follows. We discuss the Bilbao rule, empirical strategy, 
and data in the the next two sections. Then we discuss the results. The last 
section concludes. 
 
 
Draws in Chess and the Bilbao Rule   
Draws are a logical outcome of chess games: If a white and a black player in a 
chess game accurately play, the game is likely to end in a draw.
6
 That is why 
draws are common in chess, especially among top players with similar ratings. 
In the 2016 Fédération Internationale des Échecs (FIDE) World Chess 
Candidates Tournament, which determined the challenger to the world 
champion Magnus Carlsen, 71 percent of the games were draws. Historically 
two in five games among players in the top 100, and one in two games among 
players in the top ten whose rating difference is at most 400 points, were 
draws (Sonas, 2011).  
 Fans enjoy watching hard-fought drawn games, but they loathe short 
unfought-draws agreed by players called grandmaster draws. From chess fans’ 
perspective, a grandmaster draw is like a boxing match in which the boxers 
                                                          
6
 A draw occurs when a player has no legal move but is not in check (stalemate), 
players repeat the same position three times and one of them claims a draw (threefold 
repetition rule), players do not capture any piece or move any pawn in the last fifty 
moves and one of them claims a draw (the fifty-move rule), no player has enough 
materials to checkmate the other, or players agree to draw the game (a draw by 
agreement). 
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keep hugging each other, declare a truce before the first round ends, and leave 
the ring.
7
 The problem is grandmaster draws are common: One in ten chess 
games among players in the top ten were drawn prior to move 25 (Sonas, 
2011). A notorious example is the last game of the Man vs. Machine Match 
between Kasparov and Deep Junior in 2003. When Kasparov had chances to 
win the game, and the match, he offered a draw on move 23 to the 
disappointment of millions of fans watching the game (Ashley, 2003). (The 
Deep Junior team rejected the offer but the team returned it five moves later, 
which Kasparov accepted.)  In the Kasparov-Anand Professional Chess 
Association (PCA) World Championship final in 1995, the first eight games 
were draws and only one of them lasted longer than 30 moves; when Kasparov 
led by three wins after 14 rounds (with six rounds remained), the following 
two games lasted only 20 and 16 moves, respectively; in round 18, Anand 
agreed to a draw after only 12 moves. 
Players may agree to have grandmaster draws for some strategic 
reasons.
8
 Leading players in a tournament may try to preserve their positions 
because the positions are tied to financial rewards. High-rated players may 
want to avoid the risk losing games against low-rated players because they 
would lose much rating points; lower-rated players may agree to short draws 
against high-rated players just to gain rating points or to secure grandmaster 
                                                          
7
 Some chess players, however, think draws should be allowed at any stage of the 
game (see, for example Association of Chess Professionals (2016)). 
8
 See Tiong (2008) for a discussion of these strategic reasons.  
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norms.
9
 Players may feel exhausted in the middle of a tournament and agree to 
short draws to give them more time to recuperate, or they may have nothing to 
play for in later rounds because tournament leaders are impossible to catch. 
Members of the chess community have proposed solutions to the 
problem of short draws but one of the few that have been tried so far is the 
Bilbao rule, which increases rewards for a win.
10
 It was first introduced as an 
experiment in the Bilbao Blindfold Chess World Cup in 2007 (ChessBase, 
2007) to induce players to play attacking, and entertaining, chess and to 
discourage them from drawing games in tournaments’ last rounds (to 
guarantee their standings in the tournaments and, hence, prize money). Under 
the standard rule, a win, a draw, and a loss are worth 1, 0.5, and 0 point, 
respectively; under the Bilbao rule, 3, 1, and zero points—the Bilbao rule 
therefore resembles FIFA’s  move from the two-point rule to the three-point 
rule. Under the standard rule, players trailed by just one point (i.e., a win) in 
the last few rounds of a tournament may find it difficult to catch tournament 
leaders (because the leaders could easily secure draws by agreeing to short 
                                                          
9
 A norm is an indicator of an excellent performance in a chess tournament. To be a 
grandmaster, a player has to secure several norms. 
10
 Others propose to reward wins with money, forbid draws by agreement (Sofia 
rule), or forbid draw offers before a certain number of moves; others implore 
tournament organizers to invite only attacking players (see, for example, Leong and 
Leung (2005), Nunn (2005), ChessBase (2007), ChessBase (2008), Kasimdzhanov 
(2011), Shahade (2011), Shipov (2011), and Weeks (2007)).  
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draws or playing drawish openings); under the Bilbao rule, trailing players 
find it more easily to overtake leaders if they chalk up enough wins. 
 
 
Empirical Strategy and Data 
Empirical Strategy  
We estimate the effects of the Bilbao rule on how players behave using the 
following fixed-effect model 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑡𝑦 + ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑦 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖/𝑗 𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖/𝑗 𝑟𝑡𝑦 + 𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡𝑦  (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡𝑦 is a measure of outcomes of a game between white player i and 
black player j in round r of tournament t in year y; 𝐷𝑡𝑦 is an indicator equals 
one if the game was played under the Bilbao rule; 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 is the round 
characteristics of the game, which include a set of dummy variables for each 
round relative to the last round of each tournament (i.e., 
𝑟
, dummy variables 
for the last round, the penultimate round, the third-last round, etc.) to allow 
games played in later rounds to have higher importance; 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 is the 
characteristics of the players, which include a quadratic function of player i’s 
rating and that of player j’s, the number of wins each player had at the start of 
the round, the difference between the number of wins each player had and the 
highest ranked player’s at the start of the round, and player i and j fixed effects 
(
𝑖
 and 
𝑗
); 
𝑦
 is year fixed effects; and 𝜀 is the error terms. (We cannot 
include tournament fixed effects as control variables because the Bilbao rule 
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has been used by the same tournaments during the period of analysis.) 
 Identification relies on the assumption that, after controlling for the 
round characteristics, player characteristics, and year fixed effects, the games 
are comparable except that some games were played under the Bilbao rule 
while some others were not. We therefore compare games played by the same 
pairs of players, whose ratings and numbers of wins (at the start of the round) 
were similar, in the same rounds relative to the last round, and so on. To the 
extent that we have controlled for important factors that might affect players’ 
behavior and players’ participation in tournaments that used the Bilbao rule, 
the coefficient of  𝐷𝑡𝑦 in equation (1), 𝛽, would tell us about the effects of the 
Bilbao rule on players’ behavior and game outcomes. 
 We also explore whether the effects of the Bilbao rule in more 
important games— games in later rounds played by players who were still in 
contention to win tournaments—differ. We estimate 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷 + 𝜃𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝜗𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝜇𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 
 +𝜋𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝜌𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 
 + ∑ 𝛾𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + ∑ 𝛿𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 +  + 𝜀 (2) 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 is an indicator equals one if a player had 0.5-win (or 1-win) 
difference from the leaders’ and zero otherwise; and 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 is an 
indicator equals one if a round was the last two (or three) rounds. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms would tell us whether the Bilbao rule 
matters more in crucial games between leaders than it does in less important 
11 
 
games among laggards. 
 
Data 
We get the data from The Week in Chess (TWIC), a weekly chess magazine 
that reports detailed information on games played in major chess tournaments 
around the world.
11
 The data have information on players’ ratings, tournament 
types and categories, outcomes of each game, number of moves in each game, 
and openings played by players. To ensure the data are accurate, we cross-
check the TWIC data against game archives of chessgames.com, an online 
database of chess games. 
To make the games comparable, we include games played in elite 
tournaments from 2006 to 2014 in which only top grandmasters played. (We 
exclude tournaments in earlier years because the Bilbao rule was used the first 
time in the Bilbao tournament in 2008.) We have five tournaments in the 
sample: Bilbao Masters, London Chess Classic, Tal Memorial, Dortmund, and 
Corus/Tata Steel. The Bilbao Masters and London Chess Classic used the 
Bilbao rule; the others the standard rule. The tournaments were either single or 
double-round robin; almost all used the classical time control.
12
 We include 
                                                          
11
 The website is www.theweekinchess.com. We download the data on 17 June 2015. 
12
 We exclude a few other elite tournaments (e.g., Linares, Mtel Masters, Zurich 
Chess Challenge, Norway Chess, Grenke Chess Classic, Sinquefield Cup, Gashimov 
Memorial, Biel Chess Festival, and Capablanca Memorial) because they were knock-
out type tournaments, discontinued early on, recently introduced, or Category 18 or 
lower. 
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only editions of tournaments that used the classical time control (we exclude 
the London Chess Classic in 2013 and Tal Memorial in 2014 because they 
used rapid or blitz time controls).
13
 The average players’ ratings of these five 
tournaments were all above 2700 (Category 19 and above) except for 
Dortmund 2008 and London Chess Classic 2009 whose average ratings fell a 
few points below 2700. There are 1,723 games in the sample, about one in six 
were played under the Bilbao rule (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 In the basic specifications, we use the outcomes of games to measure 
players’ willingness to play attacking chess: decisive games, white wins, and 
white’s points. The first two are dummy variables equal one if a game is 
decisive and white player wins, respectively; white’s points is the point 
awarded to white players under the standard rule. If players play more 
aggressively, white and black players are more likely to play double-edged 
games, which leads to decisive games. In particular, if white players purposely 
play to win, there may be more white’s wins, and white players will get more 
points. (Because black players have no first-mover advantage, they usually 
play to equalize and only later to win if white players play inaccurate moves.) 
                                                          
13
 In classical time control, each player has 90 minutes to make the first 40 moves and 
30 minutes extra for the rest of the game and 30 seconds per move starting from 
move one. Rapid time controls refer to short time control (for example, 25 minutes 
with a ten-second increment after each move). Blitz time controls refer to very short 
time control (for example, three minutes with a two-second increment after each 
move). 
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 We also use the length of games to measure how hard players try to 
press for a win. We use three measures of outcomes: number of moves, 30 
moves or more, and 40 moves or more. The first is the number of moves by 
white players; the second and the third are dummy variables equal one if a 
game has 30 and 40 moves or more, respectively. We use 30 moves or more as 
a measure of outcome because it indicates games are played long enough; we 
use 40 moves or more as a measure of outcome because it indicates players hit 
the first time control (at move 40). 
 We also use the types of openings played by players as a measure of 
outcome—whether they are drawish or double-edged. Opening moves in chess 
are pivotal to game outcomes. Some openings are very safe for white: They 
lead to quiet and uncomplicated games, but they are drawish; other openings 
are more aggressive, which may lead to double-edged games in which white 
players keep a slight advantage and black players fight to equalize, though the 
latter may take over the initiatives if white players make errors. Whether a 
white player chooses a particular opening depends on how he thinks black 
would respond to that opening, which the player analyzes before the game is 
played. (Every chess player has access to all games his opponent played in the 
past, which gives him some ideas on whether the opponent is an expert of an 
opening and the opponent’s likely choice of variation in the event that he plays 
that particular opening.) Therefore, if a white player wants to push for a win, 
he needs to avoid drawish openings; he needs to use an aggressive opening 
that his opponent has no expertise in.  
14 
 
We use the percentage of drawn games in the past as a measure of 
whether an opening is drawish. We use three measures: percentage of drawn 
games more than 40%, 45%, and 50%, the latter is the most drawish. (All are 
dummy variables; for example, percentage of drawn games more than 40% is 
a dummy variable equals one if an opening leads to more than 40% draws in 
the past.) To construct these variables, for each of the openings used by 
players in games in our data, we find out its percentage of drawn games in the 
past on chessgames.com, and set, for example, percentage of drawn games 
more than 40% equals one if the opening has more than 40% draws in the 
past.
14
  (The website archives games played since the mid-15th century.) 
If the Bilbao rule induces players to play more aggressively, we expect 
to see the followings in the data: (1) games are more decisive and white 
players win more games, (2) games are longer, and (3) players are less likely 
to use drawish openings.  
The summary statistics in Table 2 indicates these effects. Under the 
Bilbao rule, games were six percentage points more decisive and white (black) 
players were four (three) percentage points more likely to win; on average 
white’s points did not differ, however (Panel A). Games played under the 
Bilbao rule were five moves longer; they were about 15 percentage points 
more likely to go beyond 30 or 40 moves (Panel B). Players played under the 
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 In the data, the players used 278 openings. For consistency, we convert two 
openings in the list: We change “A05 Various” to “Reti Opening” and “A13 Reti” to 
“English opening”. We downloaded the data on 17 June 2015. 
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Bilbao rule were less likely to play drawish openings: five percentage points 
less likely to play openings whose percentage of drawn games are more than 
40% or 45% (Panel C). Players were two percentage points more likely to use 
openings whose percentage of drawn games is more than 50%, however. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 The ratings of players in tournaments that used the standard and Bilbao 
rule were similar, but the two types of tournaments had some differences. 
Tournaments that used Bilbao rule on average had one fewer round; they also 
had about five fewer players on average (Panel D). Tournaments were more 
competitive under the Bilbao rule in the sense that more players had at most 
0.5 or 1-win difference from the leader’s (Panel E).   
 
 
Results 
First, we examine whether the Bilbao rule makes games more decisive. 
Secondly, we analyze two mechanisms why games may become more 
decisive: whether the rule lengthens the games and whether it induces players 
to avoid drawish openings. Then, we explore whether the rule matters more in 
more important games (games played in the last few rounds by players who 
have realistic chances to win tournaments). 
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Do Games Become More Decisive? 
Table 3 shows that the Bilbao rule seems to make games more likely to be 
decisive (or less likely to end in a draw): All estimates are both large in 
magnitude and statistically significant. Compared to games under the standard 
rule, games under the Bilbao rule are six percentage points more likely to be 
decisive (column 1). When we include round characteristics (a set of dummy 
variables for each round relative to the last round of each tournament) as 
control variables (column 2), we find the Bilbao rule increases the likelihood 
that games are decisive by eleven percentage points, an estimate that we also 
get when we add player characteristics (a quadratic function of white’s rating 
and that of black’s,  the number of wins each player had before the start of the 
round, and the difference between the number of wins each player had and the 
highest ranked player’s before the round started—each of the last two is a set 
of dummy variables) and some fixed effects (white and black’s fixed effects 
and year fixed effects) as controls (columns 3-5). Using the most complete 
specification (column 5), we find the Bilbao rule increases the likelihood that 
games are more decisive by 13 percentage points—a 33 percent increase. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The Bilbao rule makes games more decisive but to whose advantage? 
White players, Table 4 suggests: White have more wins and get more points 
(in these specifications, we calculate the points under the standard rule). The 
Bilbao rule increases the probability of white wins by 8% and 13%  when we 
17 
 
control for only round- and both round and player characteristics, respectively 
(columns 1-2). It does not seem to make black players more likely to win or 
lose, however: The estimates (columns 3-4) are small and statistically 
insignificant; it is virtually zero when we control for both round and player 
characteristics (column 4). Because white players win more games and have 
fewer draws, white players get slightly more points on average (column 6).  
The results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate the Bilbao rule induces white 
players to play more aggressively and exploit their first mover advantage, 
pressurizes black players to work harder to secure a draw, and overall makes 
games more exciting. Under the Bilbao rule, white players have more wins 
(columns 1-2 of Table 4), which indicates the Bilbao rule induces white 
players to play harder to win. It does not seem to affect black players’ 
likelihood to win or lose, however (columns 3-4 of Table 4), which means, 
given white players’ first-mover advantage and more aggressive plays, black 
players have to work harder to secure a draw. The Bilbao rule, therefore, 
induces both white and black players to play fighting chess (Table 4) and 
makes games more likely to be decisive (Table 3). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Does the Bilbao Rule Lengthen Games and Discourage Drawish Openings? 
One mechanism why games become more decisive is players play longer to 
press for a win, which Table 5 seems to suggest. On average, the Bilbao rule 
increases the number of moves by four or five (i.e., eight to ten plies) 
18 
 
depending on whether we include player characteristics as controls (columns 
1-2), which is about ten percent increase. Games are therefore more likely to 
go beyond 30 moves (by eleven percentage points, or 14 percent, if we use the 
most complete specification (column 4)); they are also more likely to go 40 
moves or more though the estimate is statistically significant when we include 
only round characteristics as control (columns 5-6). Players seem to prefer to 
battle it out rather than to settle for a quick draw when they play in 
tournaments that use the Bilbao rule.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
As Table 6 shows, another mechanism is players are more likely to 
avoid drawish openings. The Bilbao rule decreases the likelihood that players 
play drawish openings by about 11 percentage points, or 23 percent, when we 
define drawish openings as openings that have more than 40 or 45 percent 
draws in the past (columns 2 and 4). There is no evidence that they are less 
likely to use openings whose drawn games are more than 50 percent (columns 
5-6), though it may be caused by the lack of statistical power to reject the null 
hypothesis as there are very few games that use these very drawish openings. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Does the Bilbao Rule Matter More in Crucial Games? 
We explore whether the Bilbao rule matters more in games played in later 
rounds by players who have chances to win tournaments, but, as Table 7 
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shows, we do not find evidence of these. We consider two ways to define the 
later rounds—the last two rounds and the last three rounds—and two ways to 
define contesting players—0.5 win difference and 1-win difference from the 
tournament leader’s number of wins. (Regressions in Panel A use the last two 
rounds and 0.5-win difference criteria; those in Panel B the last three rounds 
and 1-win difference.) Regardless of which definition we use, we find 
statistically insignificant estimates. (The table presents the estimates of 
interaction terms with the Bilbao rule for three measures of outcomes only for 
the sake of brevity.) These results seem to suggest that the Bilbao rule does 
not differently affect games in later rounds (it affects games in all rounds 
similarly), but given that the estimates are imprecise (the standard errors are 
large, as large as the estimates if not larger) it is also possible that we lack 
sufficient statistical power to differentiate the effects of the Bilbao rule on 
games in earlier and later rounds. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The Bilbao rule induces players to play fighting chess and makes chess games 
more exciting, which would delight fans and tournament organizers. The rule, 
because it rewards more points for a win, reduces the likelihood of drawn 
games and makes games 33 percent more decisive—results that we argue are 
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causal estimates of the effects because we observe the same pairs of players 
played under the standard rule and the Bilbao rule, which allows us to control 
for many factors that may confound identification. We do not find evidence 
the rule matters more in games played in later rounds by players who have 
some chances to be tournament champions (which means either the rule 
matters equally in all rounds or we lack sufficient statistical power to reject the 
null hypothesis). 
The Bilbao rule makes white players play harder to win; it also seems 
to make black players work harder to secure a draw. White players have the 
first mover advantage and usually could, to some extent, dictate whether the 
games are open or closed, positional or tactical; what structures the pawns 
take; whether the games have the same- or opposite colored bishops, and so 
on—features of games that may determine how the middle- and end games 
play out. Black players, on the other hand, usually play catch-up and try to 
equalize first. The Bilbao rule induces white players to exploit their first 
mover advantage—and they are rewarded with more wins; because white 
players play more aggresively to win, black players would also have to play 
harder to neutralize white players’ advantage. 
We identify two possible mechanisms: Players play longer and they are 
less likely to choose drawish openings. By playing longer, players think harder 
and take more risks of making blunders but, in return, they give themselves 
more opportunities to eke out wins when their positions allow them to. By 
avoiding drawish openings, games are more likely to become double-edged, 
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which makes players more likely to make inaccurate moves and leads to 
imbalanced positions and, later, decisive outcomes.  
These findings show that incentive schemes like the three-point rule do 
work in some sports: In contrast to mixed evidence in the literature on its 
effects in soccer (Aylott and Aylott, 2007; Guedes and Machado, 2002; 
Palacious-Huerta, 2004; Dilger and Geyer, 2009; Moschini, 2010; Lee and 
Parinduri, 2016), the three-point rule works in chess. Perhaps, the rule 
provides stronger incentives in individual games in which efforts and financial 
rewards are directly linked and game dynamics and strategic interactions 
among teammates and with opponents are less complex. Chess tournaments 
that use three-point rule may attract more fans because boring draws become 
less likely; tournament organizers would like it too because sponsorships may 
become more available in the future. Leagues of individual sports may 
consider using the three-point rule to make their sports more exciting; 
however, leagues of team sports like soccer might need to continue tinkering 
with their scoring systems. Our results suggest that leagues of team sports 
have hopes to make their sports more exciting, without changing game rules 
too much, by adding sufficiently strong incentives for a win.  
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Table 1. Tournaments We Include in the Sample 
 
    
Tournament  Time period Scoring format 
Number of 
games  
Bilbao Masters 2008-2014 Bilbao 138 
London Chess Classic 2009-2014 Bilbao 139 
Tal Memorial 2006-2014 Standard 360 
Dortmund  2006-2014 Standard 292 
Corus/Tata Steel 2006-2014 Standard 794 
Notes:  The number of all games is 1,723; the number of games under the Bilbao rule is 277. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
     Standard rule Bilbao rule 
  (1) (2) 
A. Game outcomes 
  
Decisive games 0.39 0.45 
 
(0.49) (0.50) 
White players win 0.25 0.29 
 
(0.43) (0.45) 
Black players win 0.14 0.17 
 
(0.34) (0.37) 
White's points 0.56 0.56 
 
(0.31) (0.33) 
B. Length of games 
  
Number of moves 43.15 48.78 
 
(17.79) (19.21) 
30 moves or more 0.78 0.94 
 
(0.42) (0.25) 
40 moves or more 0.53 0.67 
 
(0.50) (0.47) 
C. Drawish openings 
  
Percentage of drawn games more than 40% 0.48 0.43 
 
(0.50) (0.50) 
Percentage of drawn games more than 45% 0.48 0.43 
 
(0.50) (0.50) 
Percentage of drawn games more than 50% 0.01 0.03 
 
(0.11) (0.17) 
D. Players' ratings, number of rounds, number of players 
  
White's ratings 2735.05 2753.96 
 
(50.07) (57.27) 
Black's ratings 2735.45 2754.80 
 
(49.08) (56.68) 
Number of rounds 6.01 4.53 
 
(3.40) (2.51) 
Number of players 11.70 6.79 
  (2.58) (1.76) 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics (Continued) 
 
     Standard rule Bilbao rule 
  (1) (2) 
E. Groups of games 
  
Games are played in last two rounds 0.19 0.26 
 
(0.39) (0.44) 
Games are played in the last three rounds 0.28 0.39 
 
(0.45) (0.49) 
A player has at most 0.5-win difference from the leader's 0.64 0.79 
 
(0.48) (0.41) 
A player has at most 1-win difference from the leader's 0.83 0.92 
 
(0.37) (0.28) 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the proportion or mean. All variables except white's points, 
number of moves, ratings, number of rounds, and number of players are dummy variables. The 
figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 3. The Bilbao Rule Makes Games More Decisive 
 
      Dependent variable: Decisive games         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bilbao rule 0.064* 0.112** 0.115** 0.117* 0.131** 
 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.038) (0.049) (0.050) 
Control variables 
     
Round characteristics 
 
   
Quadratic function of white- and black players' ratings 
  
  
White- and black players fixed effects 
   
 
Year fixed effects 
    

Number of observations 1,723 1,708 1,708 1,708 1,708 
Adjusted R
2
 
      
0.002  
      
0.021  
      
0.046  
      
0.157  
      
0.163  
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of the effects of the Bilbao rule on whether games are decisive 
with or without sets of control variables listed in the bottom rows. Bilbao rule equals one if a game is played 
under the Bilbao rule and zero otherwise; decisive games equals one if a game is decisive. Round 
characteristics include a set of dummy variables for rounds (the last round, second-last round, etc.), that of 
players’ number of wins before the start of the round, and that of the difference between the number of wins 
each player had and the highest ranked player’s before the round started. The figures in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, 
respectively.  
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Table 4. The Bilbao Rule Increases the Likelihood that White Players Win 
 
       Dependent variable White win Black win White's points 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bilbao rule 0.081* 0.128** 0.032 0.002 0.025 0.063* 
 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.025) (0.034) (0.022) (0.028) 
Control variables 
      
Round characteristics      
Player characteristics 
 

 

 

Adjusted R
2
 
      
0.146  
      
0.304  
      
0.125  
      
0.155  
      
0.215  
      
0.345  
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of the effects of the Bilbao rule on whether white players win, black 
players win, and points obtained by white under the standard rule with and without a set of control variables. Bilbao 
rule equals one if a game is played under the Bilbao rule and zero otherwise; white win and black win are dummy 
variables; white's points equals one if white players win, zero a loss, and 0.5 a draw. Round characteristics include a 
set of dummy variables for rounds (the last round, second-last round, etc.), that of players’ number of wins before the 
start of the round, and that of the difference between the number of wins each player had and the highest ranked 
player’s before the round started. Player characteristics include quadratic function of white- and black players' ratings 
and players fixed effects. All specifications include year fixed effects. The figures in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. Numbers of observations are 1,708. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one 
percent, respectively. 
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Table 5. The Bilbao Rules Makes Games Longer 
 
       Dependent variable Number of moves 30 moves or more 40 moves or more 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bilbao rule 5.019** 3.554* 0.142** 0.107** 0.127** 0.046 
 (1.357) (1.777) (0.024) (0.035) (0.037) (0.050) 
Control variables 
      
Round characteristics      
Player characteristics 
 

 

 

Adjusted R
2
 0.026 0.149 0.032 0.164 0.027 0.155 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of the effects of the Bilbao rule on the number of moves or the 
probability that a game goes beyond 30 or 40 moves with or without a set of control variables. Bilbao rule equals one if 
a game is played under the Bilbao rule and zero otherwise; 30 moves or more and 40 moves or more are dummy 
variables. Round characteristics include a set of dummy variables for rounds (the last round, second-last round, etc.), 
that of players’ number of wins before the start of the round, and that of the difference between the number of wins each 
player had and the highest ranked player’s before the round started. Player characteristics include quadratic function of 
white- and black players' ratings and players fixed effects. All specifications include year fixed effects. The figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. Numbers of observations are 1,708. One and two stars indicate statistical 
significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 6. The Bilbao Rule Discourages the Use of Drawish Opening 
 
       Dependent variable: Drawish openings > 40% draws > 45% draws > 50% draws 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bilbao rule -0.131** -0.105* -0.131** -0.105* 0.020 0.026 
 (0.038) (0.051) (0.038) (0.051) (0.013) (0.019) 
Control variables 
      
Round characteristics      
Player characteristics 
 

 

 

Adjusted R
2
 0.022 0.221 0.022 0.221 0.007 0.070 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of the effects of the Bilbao rule on whether players use drawish openings 
with or without a set of control variables. Bilbao rule equals one if a game is played under the Bilbao rule and zero 
otherwise; the dependent variables are dummies, for example > 40% draws equals one if the percentage of draws among 
games that use the opening is more than 40%. Round characteristics include a set of dummy variables for rounds (the last 
round, second-last round, etc.), that of players’ number of wins before the start of the round, and that of the difference 
between the number of wins each player had and the highest ranked player’s before the round started. Player characteristics 
include quadratic function of white- and black players' ratings and players fixed effects. All specifications include year fixed 
effects. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Numbers of observations are 1,708. One and two stars indicate 
statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 7. The Bilbao Rule does not Seem to Differently Affect Crucial Games  
            Dependent variable:  Decisive games   Number of moves   Drawish openings (> 40%) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
A. Last two rounds and a player has at most 0.5-win difference from the leader's 
         
Bilbao rule * last two rounds -0.08 
 
-0.15 
 
0.89 
 
-4.15 
 
0.07 
 
0.06 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(2.82) 
 
(6.43) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.15) 
Bilbao rule * 0.5-win difference from the leader's 
 
-0.09 -0.13 
  
-3.58 -5.47 
  
-0.03 -0.02 
  
(0.09) (0.11) 
  
(3.32) (4.14) 
  
(0.09) (0.11) 
Bilbao rule * last two rounds * 0.5-win difference from the leader's 
 
0.05 
   
6.31 
   
0.02 
   
(0.18) 
   
(7.22) 
   
(0.18) 
B. Last three rounds and a player has at most 1-win difference from the leader's 
         
Bilbao rule * last three rounds -0.07 
 
-0.09 
 
-1.22 
 
-13.15 
 
0.07 
 
-0.04 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(2.65) 
 
(12.54) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.24) 
Bilbao rule * 1-win difference from the leader's 
 
0.07 0.04 
  
0.81 -6.05 
  
-0.04 -0.09 
  
(0.13) (0.20) 
  
(6.42) (10.04) 
  
(0.13) (0.18) 
Bilbao rule * last three rounds * 1-win difference from the leader's 
 
0.01 
   
12.09 
   
0.12 
   
(0.25) 
   
(12.80) 
   
(0.25) 
Notes:  The numbers in each column of each panel are the estimates of the interaction terms between the Bilbao rule and dummies of groups of games such as 
whether a game is played in the last two rounds, whether one of the two players has at most 0.5-win difference with the leader's wins, etc. in a regression of a 
measure of outcome on Bilbao rule, a full set of interaction terms, and a set of control variables. For the sake of brevity, we present the estimates of only the 
interactions with Bilbao rule. Bilbao rule equals one if a game is played under the Bilbao rule and zero otherwise; the dependent variable is whether a game is 
decisive, the number of moves, or whether the percentage of draws among games that use the opening is more than 40%. Round characteristics include a set of 
dummy variables for rounds (the last round, second-last round, etc.), players' number of wins at the start of the round, and that of the difference from the highest 
number of wins at the start of the round. Player characteristics include quadratic function of white- and black players' ratings and players fixed effects. All 
specifications include year fixed effects. Numbers of observations are 1,708. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. None of the estimates is 
statistically significant at five percent level. 
 
